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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we present an identity (ID) based protocol that secures AODV and TCP so that it can be used 
in dynamic and attack prone environments of mobile ad hoc networks. The proposed protocol protects 
AODV using Sequential Aggregate Signatures (SAS) based on RSA. It also generates a session key for each 
pair of source-destination nodes of a MANET for securing the end-to-end transmitted data. Here each node 
has an ID which is evaluated from its public key and the messages that are sent are authenticated with a 
signature/ MAC. The proposed scheme does not allow a node to change its ID throughout the network 
lifetime. Thus it makes the network secure against attacks that target AODV and TCP in MANET. We 
present performance analysis to validate our claim. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of two or more nodes equipped with wireless 
communications and networking capability. The nodes within the radio range can immediately 
communicate with each other. The nodes that are not within each other‘s radio range can 
communicate with the help of intermediate nodes where the packets are relayed from source to 
destination. Each node should be configured with an unique identity to ensure the packets 
correctly routed with the help of a routing protocol of a MANET. 
 
MANETs have distinct advantages over traditional networks: (a) it can be easily set up and 
dismantled; (b) it is a cost-effective solution for providing communication in areas where setting 
up fixed infrastructures is not a suitable option constraints such as geographical location, financial 
implications, etc; (c) it can be set up in emergency situations (e.g., rescue mission). A node 
requires authentication for secure information exchange and to avoid the security threats. 
However, establishing secure communication in a MANET is particularly challenging task 
because of the following issues: (a) shared wireless medium; (b) no clear line of defense; (c) self-
organizing and dynamic network; (d) most of the messages are broadcasted; (e) messages travel 
in a hop-by-hop manner; (f) nodes are constrained in terms of computation and battery power. In 
this paper, we focus on the problem of secure route discovery and data transmission in an 
independent MANET. 
 
Routing protocols in a MANET can be classified into three categories based on the underlying 
routing information update mechanism employed: reactive (on-demand), proactive (table driven) 
and hybrid. In reactive routing protocols, nodes find routes only when they must send data to the 
destination node whose route is unknown. Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [1] and 
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Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) are under this category. On the other hand, in proactive protocols 
such as Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV), nodes periodically exchange topology 
information, and hence nodes can obtain route information any time they must send data. Hybrid 
routing protocols like zone routing protocol (ZRP) combine the best features of both reactive and 
proactive routing protocols. Each node uses proactive routing protocols to reach nodes within 
certain geographical area (zone), and reactive routing protocols for the rest. The reactive routing 
protocols are found to be more efficient in a dynamically changing topology like MANET. Under 
reactive routing, AODV is the most popular and is currently being researched actively. Internet 
engineering task force (IETF) has made AODV as the standard routing protocol for MANET [2]. 
Therefore, in this paper we have investigated and proposed improvements in AODV routing 
protocol. 
 
AODV is a reactive protocol that provides route on demand basis between nodes very efficiently. 
It floods the route request (RREQ) message throughout the network at the time of route discovery 
process. Therefore, the RREQ message reaches the destination node and reacts with a route reply 
message (RREP). The RREP is sent as a unicast, using the path towards the source node 
established by the RREQ. After the successful route discovery process, data packets can be 
delivered from the source to the destination node and vice versa. However, it does not provide 
any authentication or data protection mechanism. 
As a result following are the security threats [3] that are associated with AODV: 
 
• Attacks using modification 
 
¯ Redirection by modifying the route sequence number: AODV uses monotonically 
increasing sequence numbers to discover and maintain the routes for a destination. A 
malicious node may redirect the traffic through itself by advertising with a higher 
destination sequence number than the actual one. 
¯ Redirection by modifying the hop count: As AODV uses the hop count field to determine 
a shortest path, a malicious node may divert the traffic through itself by resetting the hop 
count value to a smaller value. 
¯ Denial-of-service by altering source/ destination: A denial-of-service attack can be 
launched in AODV by modifying the source or destination address of a packet. As a 
result, traffic may be dropped, redirected to a different destination 
¯ or to a longer route to reach to destination that causes unnecessary communication delay. 
¯ Tunneling: In a tunneling attack, two or more malicious nodes may collaborate to 
encapsulate and exchange routing messages between them along existing data routes. As 
a result, the destination node falsely believes that the shortest route from the source is 
through these collaborating nodes and wrongly sets the path through them. 
 
• Impersonation attacks In this attack, a malicious node changes its identity (such as IP 
address or MAC address) to a authorized node in the outgoing packets. The misbehaving 
node can change the topology of the network or isolate any authorized node from the 
network. 
• Attacks using fabrication 
 
¯ Falsifying route error message: AODV implements path maintenance to recover broken 
paths when nodes move. If the destination node or an intermediate node along an active 
path moves, the node upstream of the link break sends a route error message along the 
reverse path toward the source node. A malicious node may send false route error 
message to the source node. As a result, the source node re-initiates the route discovery 
process by broadcasting a route request message. 
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Recently, a number of secure routing protocols have been proposed [2]–[7]. However, secure 
routing protocols alone ensure the correctness of the route discovery, cannot guarantee secure 
data delivery at transport layer of the protocol stack. An intelligent attacker can hide itself at the 
time of route discovery to place itself on a route. Later it can start dropping, forging, misrouting 
and injecting of data packets. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is one of the transport layer 
protocol which provides end to-end connection, reliable delivery of data packets, flow control, 
congestion control and end-to-end connection termination. However, it cannot provide any 
security mechanism and following are the attacks [8] in this layer that can be seen in MANET: 
 
• SYN flooding attack: In SYN flooding attack, an attacker creates a large number of half-
opened TCP connections with a victim node but never completes the handshake to fully 
open the connection. During SYN flooding, the attacker sends a large amount of SYN 
packets to the target node, spoofing the return address of the SYN packets. When the 
target machine receives the SYN packets, it sends out SYN-ACK packets to the sender 
and waits for ACK packet. The victim node stores all the SYN packets in a fixed-size 
table as it waits for the acknowledgement of the three-way handshake. These pending 
connection requests could overflow the buffer and may make the system unavailable for 
long time. Figure 1 (a) shows the normal connection establishment using three-way 
handshaking (when node M behaves normally) and SYN flooding attack (when node M 
behaves maliciously). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Normal connection establishment using three-way handshaking and SYN flooding attack;  
(b) ACK Storm. 
 
• Session Hijacking: All the communications are authenticated only at the beginning of 
session setup. The attacker may take the advantage of this and commit session hijacking 
attack by spoofing the IP address of target machine and determining the correct sequence 
number. Subsequently it performs a DoS attack so that the target system becomes 
unavailable for a certain period of time. The attacker can now continue the session with 
the other system as a legitimate system. 
 
• ACK Storm: The attacker launches a TCP session hijacking attack at the beginning and 
it then sends injected session data to node C. Node C then acknowledges the received 
data with an ACK packet to node S. Node S is confused as the packet contains an 
unexpected sequence number. Therefore, it tries to re-synchronize the TCP session with 
node C by sending an ACK packet that contains the intended sequence number. But the 
steps are followed again and again and results in TCP ACK storm which is shown in 
Figure 1 (b). 
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In this paper, we propose an ID based Secure AODV that securely discovers and maintains the 
route. In our work we have assumed two levels of security: high and low. By high level of 
security we mean that, when a path is set up, both the source and the destination node verifies the 
authenticity of all the other nodes in the route. In addition to this, the authenticity of a node is also 
verified by its immediate downstream node. In case of low level of security, when a path is set up 
the source and destination node verifies the authenticity of each other (end-to-end) and each 
intermediate node on the route verifies the authenticity of the downstream node. In addition, we 
propose an ID based secure TCP that securely transmits data using the Diffie-Hellman [9] session 
key for the MANET nodes. In the proposed scheme, each node has an ID which is evaluated from 
its public key for authentication purpose. Following the proposed scheme a node cannot change 
its ID throughout the lifetime of the MANET. Therefore, the scheme is secure against the above 
attacks that are associated with AODV and TCP in MANET. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief note on the related research 
efforts in the area of secure routing and TCP based data transmission in MANET. System model 
followed in this paper is given in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our proposed algorithms 
namely ID based Secure AODV (IDSAODV) and TCP (IDSTCP). Section 5 presents the security 
analysis and performance of the proposed schemes and finally, conclusions are presented in 
Section 6. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
For providing security in MANET, the main objectives are to make the routing protocol secure 
and to protect transmitted data. However, these are particularly challenging for MANETs with 
dynamically changing topologies. Following schemes are proposed in the literature to secure the 
routing protocol and data transmission of TCP.  
 
Hu et al. [4] have proposed Ariadne, a secure on-demand ad hoc routing protocol based on DSR 
that prevents attackers or compromised nodes using the symmetric cryptography. To convince the 
target of the legitimacy of each field in a route request, the initiator simply includes a message 
authentication code (MAC) in the request. The target can easily verify the authenticity and 
freshness of the route request using the shared key. One-way hash functions are used to verify 
that no hop was omitted which is called per-hop hashing. Three alternative techniques to achieve 
node list authentication: the TESLA protocol [10], digital signatures, and standard MACs. 
 
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [5] uses symmetric cryptography to provide end-to-end 
authentication. The protocol is based on route querying method and it requires a Security 
Association (SA) between source and destination node. The security association is obtained via 
the knowledge of the communication counterpart’s public key. SRP makes no assumption 
regarding the intermediate nodes, which exhibits arbitrary and malicious behavior. Nodes use 
secure message transmission (SMT) [11] to ensure successful delivery of data packets. 
 
The Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [3] is based on AODV and it is a 
stand-alone protocol that utilizes cryptographic public-key certificates signed by a trusted 
authority, which associates its IP address with a public key in order to achieve the security goals 
of authentication and non-repudiation. ARAN uses cryptographic certificates to bring 
authentication, message-integrity and non-repudiation to the route discovery process. The source 
node broadcasts a signed route discovery packet (RDP) to its neighbors for a route to the 
destination. The RDP includes a packet type identifier, the address of the destination, certificate 
of the source node, timestamp and a nonce. An intermediate node uses the public key and 
certificate of its previous node to validate the signature of the RDP. After the validation, it 
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removes the signature of the previous node, appends its own signature and certificate. Similarly, 
along the reply packet (REP) each node removes signature of its previous node, appends its 
signature and certificate before forwarding it to the next node. The signature prevents malicious 
nodes from injecting arbitrary route discovery packets that alter routes or form loops. 
 
Securing AODV (SAODV) [6] proposes a set of extensions that secure the AODV routing 
packets. Two mechanisms are used to secure the AODV messages: digital signatures to 
authenticate the non-mutable fields of the messages, and hash chains to secure the hop count 
information. Since the protocol uses asymmetric cryptography for digital signatures it requires the 
existence of a key management mechanism that enables a node to acquire and verify the public 
key of other nodes that participate in the ad hoc network. 
 
The security issues related to transport layer are authentication, securing end-to-end 
communications through data encryption, handling delays, packet loss and so on. The transport 
layer protocols in MANET provides end-to-end connection, reliable packet delivery, flow control, 
congestion control and clearing of end-to-end connection. Though TCP is the main connection 
oriented reliable protocol in Internet, it does not fit well in MANET. TCP feedback (TCP-F) [12], 
TCP explicit failure notification (TCPELFN) [12], ad-hoc transmission control protocol (ATCP) 
[12], and ad hoc transport protocol (ATP) have been developed for MANET. However, none of 
them have considered the security aspect. 
 
The scheme presented in [13] is based on observation of node mobility. In this scheme, the source 
node divides the message into multiple shares and sends the shares at different times through 
different intermediate nodes. The destination node combines the shares to reconstruct the original 
message. Due to mobility an intermediate node may not be able to collect enough shares to 
recover the original message. However, it is applicable where delay can be tolerated or the 
network is dynamic 
 
The SMT scheme is presented in [11] which ensures successful delivery of data packets. In SMT, 
data messages are divided into multiple packets using secret sharing techniques and sent 
simultaneously through multiple independent routes. The destination node successfully 
reconstructs the original message, provided that sufficient shares are received. Each share is 
transmitted along with message authentication code so that the destination can verify its integrity 
and the authenticity of its origin. The destination validates the incoming shares and acknowledges 
the successfully received ones through a cryptographically protected feedback back to the source. 
However, the scheme assumes that multiple paths exist in the network which may not be true in 
real scenario.  
 
A popular security mechanism in network layer is IPSEC [14], which is used in wired networks to 
mitigate most of the attacks discussed in Section 1. IPSEC does not allow an intermediate node to 
directly access the IP header of a transmitted packet. However, transport layer protocols proposed 
for ad hoc networks have to rely on information fed back from the intermediate nodes (e.g., 
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [15]), and hence IPSEC cannot be integrated with these 
protocols [16]. Similar is the case with SSL, PCT and TLS [17] proposed mainly for the wired 
network. 
 
3. SYSTEM MODEL 
 
We consider an autonomous ad hoc network working on its own. It has no gateway or connection 
to the external world. The network is formed starting from one node and then the other nodes add 
up one by one similar to IDDIP [18]–[20]. We assume that a node, A, have two types of self 
generated RSA-based key pairs: (1) public ((NA; eA))/private (dA) key pair for message 
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verification / signing; (2) public (PKA)/ private (SKA) key pair for message encryption/decryption. 
Here, the node identifier IDA of node A is generated from its public key ((NA; eA)) using a secure 
one way hash function (H). Therefore, a node cannot change its ID within the lifetime of the 
MANET. In addition, public keys ((NA; eA) and PKA) along with identifier IDA of each node A are 
distributed before the deployment of the network so that the overhead of the proposed protocol 
can be reduce. The private keys (dA and SKA) are kept secret by each node A of the network. Table 
I presents the notations and their descriptions used in this paper to describe our proposed 
protocols.  
 
TABLE I 
 
NOTATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
 
 
 
 
4. THE ALGORITHMS 
 
As discussed in Section 2, most of the RSA public key cryptography based secure routing 
protocols of MANET need to send a large sized public key or certificate along with signature in 
each routing message. Moreover, these protocols have to rely on trusted third party (TTP) for the 
key and/or certificate distribution to the authorized nodes of the network. In this paper, we 
develop a RSA-based routing protocol that tries to overcome these problems to a considerable 
extent by using self-authentication technique. The proposed routing protocol is based on AODV 
routing protocol. We also observe that the secure routing protocols may not ensure secure data 
delivery at transport layer of OSI architecture. Here we also present a technique to secure the 
three-way handshaking process of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). 
 
Secure Routing 
 
We have considered two cases depending upon the level of security: Case 1: High and Case 2: 
Low. In Case 1, i,e., for high level of security (sec_ level = 1), during routing process, the source 
and destination nodes separately verify the authenticity of all other nodes in the path. Further, 
every intermediate node verifies the authenticity of its immediate upstream node. In Case 2, i.e., 
for low level of security (sec_level = 0), during routing process, both the source and the 
destination nodes verify authenticity of each other. Also each node on the path verifies the 
authenticity of its immediate upstream node from where it receives the messages (hop-by-hop). 
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Our proposed routing protocol uses sequential aggregate signatures (SAS) based on RSA [21], 
[22]. It has two parts: (a) secure route discovery and session key (KAB) generation; (b) secure 
route maintenance. 
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Secure Route Discovery and Session Key Generation: Case 1: When we need high level of 
security i.e., sec_level = 1, the secure route discovery procedure of the proposed protocol works 
as follows: to create a path between a source node S and a destination node D, the source node, S, 
first generates a prime number p along with two random numbers r1 and g, where p and g are 
publicly known parameters. S then computes R1 = gr1 (mod p), encrypts R2 = EPKD(R1) broadcasts 
it in a signed (σS) RREQS message along with IDS to its neighbours. The RREQS message also 
contains source IP IPS, source sequence number SNS, broadcast ID BctID, and destination IP IPD 
as similar to AODV protocol. 
 
An intermediate node, I, on receiving the signed (σ(I-1))RREQ(I-1) message from node (I-1) first 
checks the authenticity of the node (I - 1). If node (I - 1) is authenticated, node I inserts its ID IDI 
and subsequently updates the RREQI. The intermediate node I also generates an aggregate 
signature (σI ) from both RREQI message and the received signature (σ(I-1)). Thereafter node I 
broadcasts RREQI message along with the aggregate signature σI to its neighbours. This process 
continues till the RREQ message is received by the destination node. 
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On receiving the signed (σt) RREQt message, the destination node D first checks the authenticity 
of all the intermediate nodes IDt including source node IDS on the route. It also checks the 
authentication of the received aggregate signature σt by verifying all the signatures of node S to 
node t. If both checks pass, the destination D decrypts R = DSKD(R2) and generates the session key 
KDS = Rr2 (mod p). It also generates a random number r2 and computes R3 = gr2 (mod p). D 
thereafter encrypts R4 = EPKS (R3) and unicasts it in a signed (σD) RREPD message with its IDD to 
S along the reverse direction of RREQ message. The RREPD message also contains other 
parameters of AODV (such as, source IP IPS, destination sequence number SND). An intermediate 
node verifies the authenticity of the RREP message and combines its signature with the signatures 
of previous hops on the route in the same way as RREQ message. When S receives the signed (σt) 
RREPt message, it checks the authenticity of each node including D on the route by verifying all 
the IDs and σs. If both checks pass, S decrypts R = DSKS (R4) and generates the session key KSD = 
Rr1 (mod p) to send the data packets to D via this route. Figure 2 shows an example of the route 
discovery process of our proposed routing protocol for Case 1. 
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Fig. 2. An example of secure route discovery process for Case 1 
 
Case 2: For low security level, i.e. sec_level = 0, initially the source node broadcasts signed σS 
RREQS message along with its ID, IDS, to the neighbours in a way similar to the previous case. 
An intermediate node, I, on receiving the signed σ(I-1) RREQ(I-1) message from node (I-1), first 
checks the authenticity of the node (I-1). If the node (I-1) is authenticated, it removes the 
signature of the node (I-1), inserts IDI and updates the RREQI message. It also generates its own 
signature on the RREQI message and the signature σS of S and broadcasts it to its neighbours. This 
process continues till the RREQ message reaches the destination node. On receiving the signed σt 
RREQt message, the destination node D first checks the authenticity of the node IDt and the 
source node IDS. It also checks the authentication of the received signature σt (signature of the 
node t from whom it receives RREQ) and σS of the source node. If both checks pass, D generates 
the session key KDS and unicasts the signed (σD) RREPD message with its IDD to S along the 
reverse direction of RREQ message in the same way as in the first case. An intermediate node I 
verifies the signature σ(I-1) of the received RREP(I-1) message. If checks pass, it removes the 
signature σ(I-1) and ID ID(I-1), and inserts its own ID IDI and subsequently updates RREPI message. 
It also generates signature σI on RREPI and the signatures σD of D. When S receives the signed 
(σt) RREP message, it checks the authenticity of the previous node t and D on the route by 
verifying the ID and σ of both the nodes. If both checks pass, S generates the session key KSD to 
send the data packets to D via this route. An example of the route discovery process of our 
proposed routing protocol for Case 2 is shown in Figure 3. The route discovery process for 
source, intermediate and destination nodes are presented in Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and 
Algorithm 3 respectively. 
 
Secure Route Maintenance: Case 1: For high level of security, i.e., sec_level = 1, the proposed 
protocol maintains a established route as follows: If a node X detects that its immediate down link 
towards D is broken, it sends signed (σX) RERRX message with IDX along the reverse route toward 
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S. On receiving a signed (σ(I-1)) RERR(I-1) message from node (I-1), an intermediate node I 
immediately checks the authenticity of the node (I-1) by verifying the signature σ(I-1) and ID(I-1).   
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of secure route discovery process for Case 2 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. An example of secure route maintenance process for Case 1 
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Fig. 5. An example of secure route maintenance process for Case 2 
 
If node (I-1) is authenticated, it inserts IDI and updates the RERRI message. The node I also 
generates a signature σI from the RERRI message and the received signature σ(I-1) and forwards the 
signed σI RERRI message along the path toward S. On receiving the σt RERRt from t, S verifies all 
the signatures and IDs of the nodes on the route. If both verifications pass, S initiates the route 
discovery process of our proposed routing protocol. The secure route maintenance process for 
Case 1 of our proposed routing protocol is given by an example in Figure 4. 
 
Case 2: For low level of security, i.e., sec_level = 0, the route maintenance of the proposed 
protocol works as follows: After detecting the connection loss, node X sends signed (σX) RERRX 
message with IDX along the reverse path toward S. On receiving the signed (σ(I-1)) RERR(I-1) 
message from node (I - 1), an intermediate node I first checks the authenticity of the node (I - 1) 
by verifying the signature σ(I-1) and ID(I-1). If the node (I - 1) is authenticated, it removes ID(I-1) and 
updates the RERRI message by appending IDI. It also generates the signature σI on the RERRI 
message and the signature σX of node X. Node I forwards the signed σI RERRI message along the 
path toward S. On receiving the σt RERRt from t, S verifies the signatures σt, σX and IDt, IDX. If 
both verifications pass, S initiates the route discovery process. The secure route maintenance 
process for Case 2 of our proposed routing protocol is shown by an example in Figure 5. The 
algorithm for secure route maintenance process of our proposed routing protocol is given in 
Algorithm 4. 
 
Secure Data Transmission 
 
As discussed in the previous Section 4, after discovering the secure path, source and destination 
node have common session secret key (i.e., KSD= KDS). Initially source node (S) starts connection 
establishment with destination node (D) using three-way handshaking of TCP. S at first generates 
the initial sequence number (ISNS) from a random number (R) and a hash function of source port, 
destination port, IDS, IDD and session secret key KSD. Subsequently, it generates authentication tag 
(δS) on SYN(ISNS) segment using HMAC function and KSD, sends it to D along with SYN(ISNS) 
segment. On receiving the SYN(ISNS) + δS, D generates the authentication tag (δG) from the 
received SYN(ISNS) and KDS. If the generated tag (δG) and received tag (δS) are same, S is 
authenticated to D. At this point D also generates the initial sequence number (ISND) and 
authentication tag (δD) on SYN(ISND) + ACK(ISNS+1) segment in a way similar to S, and sends it 
to S along with the segment. On receiving SYN(ISND) + ACK(ISNS+1) + δD, S generates the 
authentication tag (δG) on SYN(ISND) +ACK(ISNS+1) segment and matches the generated tag (δG) 
with the received tag (δD). If both are same, D is authenticated to S, and ACK(ISND+1) + δS 
segment is sent by S. D generates the authentication tag (δG) on the received ACK(ISND+1) 
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segment and checks it with the received tag (δS). If the tags match, S is authenticated. This 
completes the three-way handshake process and therefore D allocates the resource for S to start 
transmission of data along with the authentication tag.  
 
The algorithms for the three-way handshake connection establishment process for source (S) and 
destination (D) nodes are given in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 respectively. Figure 6 shows a 
schematic for a secure three-way handshaking connection establishment process of our proposed 
protocol using a timing diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
The above process is followed to secure the three-way handshake connection termination process 
too. Session key KSD terminates after the end of one session or at any stage if authentication fails 
in the three-way handshake process. For a new session, a new key is obtained at the time of route 
discovery and the process is repeated. 
 
5. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
In our proposed protocol the identifier ID of a node is generated from its public key using a 
secure one-way hash function. In addition, the public keys and ID of the nodes are distributed 
before the deployment of the MANET. As a result, a node cannot change its ID within the 
lifetime of a MANET. Therefore, impersonation attacks or unauthorized participation is not 
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possible. In our proposed secure routing protocol, as the source/destination node signs the RREQ/ 
RREP packet using the private key of the source/ destination node, a malicious node will not be  
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Timing diagram of secure three-way handshaking connection establishment process 
 
 
 
able to modify the route sequence number. As RREQ/ RREP packets are signed by the each 
intermediate node, a malicious node cannot change the value of the hop count field. Due to 
similar reason, a malicious node cannot change the source/ destination address of a packet. In the 
first scenario, node IDs are cached and the routing messages are signed by them. The source/ 
destination node verifies the authenticity of each node on the route. In the second scenario, 
authentication is done in hop-by-hop and end-to-end manner. Therefore, two or more malicious 
nodes cannot collaborate to make the tunnel. In the proposed scheme, messages are signed by the 
nodes on the route at the time of route maintenance. Therefore, a malicious node cannot falsely 
inject route error message to the source. 
 
 
In our proposed secure transmission control protocol, all the segments are sent along the message 
authentication code (MAC) [23] tags. A MAC tag is a short piece of information used to 
authenticate a message and to provide integrity and authenticity assurances on the message. 
Integrity assurances detect accidental and intentional message changes, while authenticity 
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assurances affirm origin of the message. Here, the MAC tag is generated using a hash function, a 
session secret key and an arbitrary-length message. Further, a node cannot hide and change its ID  
 
 
 
or the ID cannot be spoofed by any other nodes in the network. This makes the SYN flooding 
attack difficult for an attacker. Initial sequence number (ISN) is generated by the source and the 
destination nodes from a monotonically increasing random number (R) and a hash function of 
source port, destination port, node identifiers of the source and destination nodes, and a session 
secret key KSD. Therefore, a malicious node may not be able to guess the initial sequence number 
(ISN) and therefore cannot hijack the session or launch ACK storm in the MANET. 
 
As the scheme uses either signature (in case of secure routing protocol) or MAC (in case of secure 
transmission control protocol) for authentication, message forging is not possible. Therefore, the 
attacks associated with AODV and TCP are not possible. An attack may be possible if an attacker 
is somehow able to generate a public/ private key pair that is exactly similar to an authorized node 
in the network. This probability is 1=2k, where k is the size of the public key. For k = 1024 bits, it 
can be seen that the probability is extremely low and is almost impossible within a small life time 
of MANET. 
 
As our proposed protocol uses identity-based cryptography, it does not need certificate for 
authentication. Further, public keys along with IDs of the nodes are distributed before the 
deployment of the MANET. Thus it eliminates the need of sending the public key with the packet. 
Since the SAS-based scheme is based on plain RSA, its per-signer signature generation cost is 
equivalent to that of a plain RSA signature. However, following are the overheads of our 
proposed protocols: 
 
• Each node has to maintain the list of public keys along with IDs of other nodes in the 
network. 
• In Case 1, IDs and signatures of all the nodes in the route are required to be cached. 
However, the signature expands by one bit per signers that is if the number of signers is t, 
then the signature expands by t-bit here. 
•  Each node has to verify its predecessor and sign the messages. Source/destination node 
has to verify all the nodes on the route in Case 1. 
• To generate the session key for a session, each time encryption and decryption has to be 
done by the source node and the destination node respectively. 
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It may be noted here that our proposed protocol may not detect attacks from internal or 
compromised malicious nodes. It requires trust based protocol [24] as a second wall of defence to 
detect attacks by internal malicious nodes. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper the popular MANET routing protocol AODV and the standard TCP has been 
improved and made suitable for using it in mobile ad hoc networks. The proposed routing 
protocol provides security to the route discovery and route maintenance phases. Further, the 
three-way handshaking process of standard TCP has been secured. Here each node is made to 
have an ID that is generated from its public key and is unchangeable throughout the lifetime of 
the network. Performance analysis shows that our proposed protocols are secure against the 
attacks that are associated with AODV and TCP in MANET. 
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